We investigate the performance measurement of the implementing agencies of EU Structural Funds in Hungary. Following the advice of Th iel and Leeuw (2002), we focus on the incentives created by the institutional environment of these agencies. Th e core of this environment is a double principal-agent relationship between the European Commission (EC), the national government and the Managing Authority. We investigate its institutional features and the resulting organisational incentives for Managing Authorities in Hungary. Relying on programme evaluations, we explore how these incentives actually aff ected the design and use of performance measurement by Authorities in two policy fi elds: active labour-market policy and higher education. We fi nd that external incentives to focus on absorption and formal compliance created bias against integrating performance measurement into the policy process and tackling problems of performance risk and non-measurability.
Introduction
Th e Structural Funds of the European Union have played a major role in bringing performance measurement to the public sectors of Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary. Although indicator-based performance management exists in sporadic forms in the public administrations of these Member States (Nemec and Sagat 2011; Hajnal and Ugrósdy 2015) , the regulations of EU Funds require the production of indicators of a scale and quality that far exceeds these other practices. Th e novelty of EU Funds in performance measurement is underscored by the administrative traditions of the region that emphasise legalism at the expense of effi ciency (Hajnal and Jenei 2007) . Compared to most "older" Member States, the signifi cance of Funds is also amplifi ed by their much greater share within the public budget. In the period 2007 -2013, the average share of Structural Fund allocations within government capital expenditure was 37 % in EU12 while merely 4 % in EU15, according to the estimates of the European Commission (EC 2013a) .
Th e arrival of Structural Funds may be seen as a welcome opportunity for this region of Europe to gain experience with advanced forms of performance management. Performance indicators can help ensure a more effi cient use of public resources (OECD 1996) and support evidence-based policy-making (Boaz and Nutley 2009) . Assisted by the European Commission, this is a benevolent, if perhaps coercive, instance of policy transfer. By contrast, sceptics of the worldwide proliferation of measurement techniques may point to their dangers. Long lists of "dysfunctions" and "diseases" of performance measurement may be quoted, suggesting that it may actually worsen rather than improve performance in any meaningful sense (Bouckaert and Balk 1991; Th iel and Leeuw 2002) . Whether the positive or negative scenario prevails, depends, among other things, on the organisational context and the institutional environment in which performance measurement is carried out (Th iel and Leeuw 2002) . Th is prompts us to investigate how the institutions governing the implementation of EU cohesion policy infl uence the design and use of performance indicators.
Th e complexity and cross-country variation of the institutions of EU cohesion policy may seem forbidding (cf. Molle 2008) . Th e literature on "multi-level governance" argues that the policy fi eld is characterised by fl uid, network-type policymaking, including a plethora of actors at several levels of government (Marks 1996; Bache 2007) . Even if only the formal management structures of Structural Funds are considered, they appear highly complex and byzantine (Wostner 2008; Ferry et al. 2007 ). Nonetheless, we believe that it is possible to focus on a limited set of institutions that are most likely to infl uence performance measurement in this fi eld. Th e key impetus to use performance indicators comes from the adoption of quantifi ed EU-level objectives adopted in high-level agreements, such as the Agenda 2020 or the Lisbon Treaty. Th ese are refl ected and expanded in national "reference frameworks", signed between the European Commission and each Member State. Th ese frameworks consist of Operational Programmes (OP), each of which has its own set of indicators, purportedly to track its contribution to national objectives. Member States must set up an implementing agency -called Managing Authority -for each OP. Th is agency is responsible for monitoring the progress and ensuring the fulfi lment of indicators (EC 1997) .
Th us, a double principal-agent (PA) relationship is at the heart of the implementation process of cohesion policy. As Blom-Hansen (2005) and Bauer (2006) argued, the relationship between the European Commission and the national government can be perceived as an agency relationship. Th e Commission has the task of ensuring that Member States follow EU regulations and fulfi l their contractual promises laid down in the Operational Programmes. Th e national government further delegates implementation to the Managing Authorities and thereby creates a second, lower-level principal-agent relationship. In our institutional analysis, we focus on this double PA structure.
We follow the approach of new institutional economics in perceiving institutions as "rules of the game" (North 1990 ) that create incentives for human action. A comprehensive institutional analysis would need to discuss both rules within the organisations responsible for performance measurement and the external rules of their institutional environment. Although future analysis should consider intra-organisational issues, we here restrict our attention to the latter and consider Managing Authorities as "black boxes". Th us, we formulate two research questions: 1) What incentives are created by the double PA relationship between the European Commission, the national government and the Managing Authority that infl uence the last-named organisation's decisions about the design and use of performance measurement ?
2) How are these incentives refl ected in the actual practice of performance measurement within Managing Authorities ?
Methodology
We restrict our attention to a single country with which we are particularly familiar: Hungary. Th e case-study method is justifi ed by our interest in a qualitative analysis of institutional mechanisms. Although we cannot validate our fi ndings for other Member States, we believe that the main institutional issues are similar, at least where EU Funds weigh as heavily in the public budget as in Hungary. Th e external incentive structure of implementing agencies is reconstructed on the basis of legal regulations, political and administrative documents as well as the secondary analysis of existing empirical literature on cohesion policy. Since all Managing Authorities in Hungary were institutionalised in essentially the same way, we provide an analysis that is valid for all of them.
As for answering the second research question about the actual eff ects of institutional incentives, we focus on two policy fi elds where large amounts of Funds were used: active labour-market programmes and higher education. Substantial amounts of EU Funds have been spent on virtually all policy areas in Hungary, and it would be impossible to cover all of them in suffi cient institutional detail. Th e examined programmes belong among the "soft er" measures of cohesion policy focussed on human and economic development as opposed to more traditional, "hard" tools aiming at infrastructure development. While the latter certainly remain substantial and would require additional analysis, the former have been gaining importance, as has been clear from EU-level strategies and guidelines for some time (EC 2010) .
Our evidence about the actual practice of performance measurement is based on two evaluations of development programmes, commissioned by the National Development Agency of Hungary.
2 Each evaluation covered all forms of fi nancial support assigned from Structural Funds to interventions in one policy area between 2006 and 2012: active labour-market services and higher education, respectively. Th e underlying idea was to examine how EU funds were able to contribute to the broad strategic goals of the policy fi eld. Th e evaluations used mixed empirical methodology, including (i) the analysis of programme documents, relevant legal texts, public databases and other written information sources; (ii) interviews with top policy makers and offi cials responsible for programme design as well as implementation and policy experts; (iii) case studies based on fi eld work in higher education institutions and providers of active labour-market services; and (iv) an online national survey among non-profi t employment service providers.
External incentives for the implementing agencies of Structural Funds in Hungary
Th e organisational incentives of a Managing Authority are shaped by its principalagent relationship with the national government. Th e goals and actions of the government as a principal are, in turn, infl uenced by its higher-level PA relationship with the Commission. In other words, the higher-level PA contract constrains the lower one. As a fi rst step, we analyse the characteristics of the former and the incentives they provide for the national government. As a second step, we examine how these incentives infl uence the characteristics of the government's lower-level PA contract and the Managing Authority's resulting incentives.
The PA relationship between the European Commission and the national government
Th e institutionalisation of cohesion policy refl ects the perennial concern of Member States to strike a balance between preserving their sovereignty and enabling the European Commission to coordinate and enforce common policies eff ectively (Doleys 2000 , Tallberg 2003 . Th e organisation of the policy fi eld is based on what legal and administrative scholars call the "principle of limited powers" (Siedentopf and Speer 2003) . National governments retain the right to decide on the size of Fund budgets for periods of 5 or 7 years as well as their allocation among Member States.
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Th ey also bear the primary responsibility for planning and implementing the programmes on which national allocations are spent. Th e Commission plays a role as a coordinator and supervisor of the spending of Funds. Parallel to the decision-making process on fund allocation, the Commission proposes EU-level objectives and general administrative rules for the Funds. Once the allocations are made and these rules are adopted by national representatives, the Commission translates them into formal contracts with Member States, nowadays called "National Strategic Reference Frameworks" that consist of "Operational Programmes" devoted to broad policy fi elds or regions. Th e Commission negotiates and accepts these contracts and subsequently monitors their implementation by national governments. PA relationships between the Commission and national governments are thus created.
Th e Commission has neither mandate nor resources to get involved in substantive policy issues during the implementation of the Operational Programmes. It has no right to withhold or reallocate allocated Funds either, except for cases of serious procedural irregularities. Th us, its role is largely confi ned to enforcing stringent formal obligations about process and output (Bachtler and Mendez 2007) . Its contract with each Member State defi nes (i) explicit performance indicators, (ii) rules for the Member State's internal procedures of monitoring and reporting to ensure the supply of credible information about the indicators adopted, and (iii) procedures of fi nancial control and auditing to prevent the fraudulent diversion of funds. In short, it takes the form of a performance contract which specifi es quantifi ed measures or "indicators" of performance and, at the same time, defi nes procedures for the agent to provide credible information about these measures.
Although the Commission cannot sanction the non-fulfi lment of indicators with monetary penalties, it has two powerful means to enforce the contract. One is its right to suspend the payment of funds if administrative irregularities are suspected. Th e reliable collection of data for indicators is one such requirement (EC 2013b). Moreover, the number and complexity of administrative prescriptions is immense, which provides the Commission with considerable discretion in exercising this right. Th e second method is the naming and shaming of Member States based on a detailed monitoring of their performance and making the non-fulfi lment of contractual obligations public (Tallberg 2003; Zängle 2004) .
Th e primary measure the Commission uses to compare countries and policy areas in its interim evaluations is the rate of absorption, i.e. the percentage of funds spent (EC 2012; EC 2013a) . Th is seems a peculiar choice since spending in itself has little to do with actual performance. However, the same phenomenon was observed in the fi eld of foreign aid to developing countries (Edgren et al. 1996; Svensson 2006) . Th e explanation there was that the outcomes and eff ects of aid programmes can only be measured imperfectly and in the longer term, while political donors (and their voters) demand quick and easy-to-digest feedback about the use of funds. In a similar way, Brussels is expected to verify its competence in supervising the spending of Funds by Member States (Molle 2008) . Absorption rate is used as a very imperfect measure of how far each country has travelled in implementing its Operational Programmes.
Th us, the Commission creates incentives for the national government to comply with formal procedural obligations and ensure timely absorption. Its demands are backed up by its ability to hold back funds and apply reputational sanctions. Although there may be tension between the Commission's two goals (since absorption would be quickest without any imposed rules), they have one thing in common: neither pertains to the substantive outcomes or eff ects of the fi nanced programmes.
Th e national government must implement its contract with the Commission in its domestic political environment, which will also infl uence its incentives. On the hand one, absorption may become a political issue, especially when the Funds' contribution to the national budget is very large. Th e government must prove that no money will be "lost" due to its incapability of organising the proper management of funds. On the other hand, electoral concerns, interest-group pressure or other domestic factors may provide incentives to use EU-funded programmes to achieve substantive, rather than merely formal, policy objectives. Th is is especially likely if EU funds are large enough to infl uence politically salient goals, such as reduction in unemployment, improving public health care, etc. Th ere may, again, be tension between the two incentives since quick absorption may come at the expense of effectiveness.
Overall, the Commission's and domestic political expectations are likely to provide a strong incentive for the national government to focus on absorption. Since the Commission ties absorption to strict compliance with formal procedural requirements, this also implies a strong incentive for formal compliance. If timely spending is the government's paramount concern, it is likely to consider the production of contracted indicators as a means to this end, too. Th ey will be expected to serve the performance of formal contractual obligations rather than the better performance of the fi nanced programmes in terms of effi ciency, eff ectiveness or any other normatively defensible criteria. Domestic political concerns that mitigate the pressure to absorb have no clear implications for the design and use of indicators. However, they at least make room for the possibility that the government may be interested in using performance measurement as a tool to improve the eff ectiveness of EU-funded programmes in achieving substantive policy objectives.
If we look at the empirical evidence on the actual goals of Hungary's government in spending EU Funds between 2006 and 2013, we observe that absorption became a salient political issue from early on and only grew more important as time progressed. As an internal memorandum of the (left -wing) government made clear in 2008, "the (political) measure of success both externally [by the European Commission] and internally [in Hungary] will be the degree of absorption (since eff ectiveness can be judged only aft er some time). " In 2012, the prime minister (now from the political right) agreed: "Every single cent of the EU funds has to fi nd its way to its destination and we will not accept any compromise in this".
5 Basically all reports and evaluations agree that absorption and the regularity of spending were the primary goals of cohesion policy in Hungary as it was implemented both between 2004 and 2006 and between 2007 and 2013. 6 Although absorption was a political "trump-card", governments also wanted the funds to contribute eff ectively to their policy goals. Th e framework contract for the period 2007 / 2013, signed with the Commission, was widely marketed by the government as the "New Hungary Development Plan" which ought to support several policy goals.
7 Aft er a change in government in 2010, this expectation grew markedly stronger as the government introduced its own new development plan for reinvigorating the economy aft er the fi nancial crisis 8 (called New Széchenyi Plan, named aft er a great Hungarian 19 th -century statesman), which was fi nanced entirely by EU Funds. By "repackaging" the programmes co-fi nanced by the EU and placing it high on its political agenda, the government increased its political commitment to spending the funds in ways that further its own substantive policy goals. In fact, it could hardly have done otherwise. It had little non-EU resources to fi nance anything beyond the basic routine activities of the public sector. Hungary's prime minister claimed in 2012 that "90 per cent of all funds spent on development in Hungary come from the European Union. " 9 Such a magnitude was supported by the calculations of the European Commission about the share of ERDF and Cohesion Fund allocations in government capital expenditure: 67.4 % for the 2007 -2013 period -compared to an average 4 % in EU15 and 37 % in EU12. Th e share of funds remaining for the years 2013 -2015, when payment was still allowed, was even higher: 87.7 % (EC 2013a). But "development" is a broader concept than capital outlays: EU funds played an immense role in virtually all budgetary measures beyond the automatic basic fi nancing of government activities and even as replacements of such fi nancing. As we shall illustrate below, they were used to fi lling gaps in ordinary (non-development) budgetary appropriations, which decreased signifi cantly as a result of drastic austerity measures put in place by the national government aft er 2010.
10 EU funds were seen in 2006 -not unreasonably -as "free money that was additional to sectoral budgets. " Consequently, existing sectoral policies could be pursued largely independent of EU funds. As a result of the fi scal crisis leading to austerity, the situation changed: the government had to realise that "EU funds are virtually the only sources available for any policy initiatives. "
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All in all, absorption had high political salience and remained the overriding concern of Hungarian governments throughout the entire period. Policy eff ectiveness remained secondary but gradually increased in importance, especially aft er national budgetary resources ebbed due to recession and austerity. Th e next step in our analysis is to explore how this infl uenced the government's actions in shaping the lower-level PA relationships with Managing Authorities.
The PA relationships between the national government and its Managing Authorities
Although EU regulations determine many details, national governments have substantial autonomy in choosing which existing or newly created organisations fulfi l the roles of Managing Authorities, and how they are organised. Th e national government can use its discretion to shape its PA relationships with these agencies in ways that refl ect its own objectives.
Th e literature stresses two dimensions in which governments use their autonomy: (1) their place in the territorial hierarchy of government 12 (Hooghe and Marks 2003) , and (2) their embeddedness in national public administration (Taylor et al. 2000; Ferry et al. 2007; Th ielemann 2002) . While the fi rst dimension is usually considered important because cohesion policy is supposed to further "regionalisation", it is virtually a non-issue in Hungary as it opted for a very centralised system, with marginal roles for organisations at the regional (NUTS 2) level. Th us, we focus on embeddedness. In this dimension, comparative studies of national implementation systems emphasise the crucial choice between pre-existing organisations integrated in national public administration and newly created agents specialising on cohesion policy, what Ferry et al. (2007) call "integrated" and "diff erentiated" systems of implementation, respectively. 13 In the ideal-type of an integrated system, the roles of Managing Authorities are fi lled by existing organisations within various sectoral (e.g. health, economic development) or functional (e.g. fi nance) or subnational administrations. In a diff erentiated system, a wholly new and specialised network of organisations dedicated to cohesion policy may be created (Ferry et al. 2007 ). Real systems tend to fall between these two clear-cut extremes.
14 If the government's key concern is the absorption of funds, it will want an agent to focus on this goal in a single-minded fashion. It should set this as the overarching organisational goal for the implementing agent, to be achieved by pursuing the subordinated goals of timely spending, no irregularities and the production of contracted indicators. A straightforward option is to create a single-purpose organisation dedicated solely to programmes fi nanced from EU funds. By contrast, if the government wants the agent to consider programme aspects which are not to be reported to the Commission but are important for the government's policy goals, the agent's organisational goals should include these other aspects as well. A natural choice is to assign implementation to an integrated agency which is responsible for overall policy eff ects in a certain policy fi eld or regional area. As a corollary, a diff erentiated system would use performance indicators mainly as instruments of absorption, whereas an integrated system would be more likely to use them, at least partly, as instruments of policy eff ectiveness.
In 2006, Hungary opted for a diff erentiated and highly centralised system of implementation. It united all Managing Authorities (MAs) in a separate ministry called the National Development Agency and made them responsible for the design, monitoring and evaluation of Operational Programmes. Th e system was separated as much as possible from pre-existing parts of public administration. Th is is perhaps most clearly refl ected in the Hungarian habit of referring to all EU-funded projects as measures of "development policy" (fejlesztéspolitika), viewed as an independent policy fi eld.
Th e radical diff erentiation of the management of EU Funds was partly a response to the perceived diffi culties of the partially integrated system put in place after Hungary's accession to the EU (Heil 2013) . In that system, Managing Authorities were integrated into ministries as ordinary departments. Th e main problems were the slowness of implementation and the proliferation of tendering and contracting procedures. What was demanded by potential benefi ciaries and their political representatives was "simplifi cation, standardisation and acceleration" (Heil 2013, 38) . Th e institutional system was designed so that its central goal and success criterion would be the smooth implementation of Operational Programmes rather than contributing to any specifi c substantive policy goals. It was acknowledged from the start that it would be challenging to channel suffi cient sectoral expertise into implementation and to coordinate EU-funded projects with nationally fi nanced activities (Heil 2013) . Nonetheless, the institutional setup was designed to give priority to absorption and regular implementation.
Th e system set up in 2006 was kept in place aft er a change in government in 2010 despite far-reaching institutional reforms in many segments of the public sector. As the programming period progressed, absorption remained the most important political measure of success for the National Development Agency. Th e opening page of its website contained an "absorption meter", giving real-time feedback on the amount of EU Funds spent to date. When its president left offi ce in 2013, the government evaluated his performance in the public solely in terms of absorption rates.
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Aft er 2010, the role of sectoral ministries in the design (but not the implementation) of individual fi nancing constructions was somewhat strengthened. Th ey became responsible for "preparing the professional content of fi nancing constructions" and "following the professional aspects of tendering calls and strategic projects". 16 Hence, they were given a stronger say in the professional content of project designs while the entire institutional system of implementation was kept in place. Th is can be interpreted as a small step towards an integrated model. Overall, the institutional development of cohesion policy in Hungary refl ected the government's primary objective of absorption and only a secondary (though growing) emphasis on policy effectiveness. Th e political concern for ensuring absorption became institutionalised in the system of "single-purpose" implementing agencies, diff erentiated from the rest of public administration. Th e overriding organisational goal of Managing Authorities was absorption ensured by formal compliance with EU regulations. Th is suggests that, within their competence, implementing agencies would design and use performance indicators primarily to comply with the formal requirements of the Commission, before all other considerations. As a next step, we investigate if this was indeed the case in their actual practice in two fi elds of programmes: active labour-market policy and higher education.
The practice of performance measurement by Managing Authorities
Operational Programmes must be translated into project-form contracts signed with fi nal benefi ciaries. Managing Authorities must design and manage project systems so that they contribute to the performance of Operational Programmes as expressed in its offi cial indicators. Th ey must monitor in a verifi able way what projects accomplish. Th e system of monitoring must also follow and measure project-specifi c aspects of performance that are not captured by programme-level indicators. Overall, implementing agencies view performance indicators primarily as elements in the governance of project-form contracts with fi nal benefi ciaries.
In the general practice of EU cohesion policy, projects usually take two forms: competitive grant schemes and strategic projects (Wostner 2008) . Th e former typically expect a multitude of fi nal benefi ciaries (lower-level public organisations, nonprofi ts, fi rms or even individuals) to carry out relatively small sets of tasks. Strategic projects tend to be signed with high-level public organisations (such as sectoral ministries, their national or regional agencies). Th ese public bodies may use their own mechanisms of governance to allocate resources within a single large project, designed for the policy fi eld, perhaps independently of EU funding. In such a case, the Managing Authority is responsible for performance measurement at the project level, while the fi nanced public organisation may use its internal system of performance measurement (if there is one) within the project.
Th e design of projects takes place in several steps as broad Operational Programmes are divided into ever smaller parts until individual contracts are defi ned. Our empirical evidence suggested that we simplify the analysis of this process by defi ning only two levels: (i) the design of project systems, and (ii) the design of fi nal project contracts. We examine the two levels in turn.
The design of project systems
Active labour-market policy. Structural Funds made up very signifi cant parts in the fi nancing of active labour-market policy between 2007 and 2013 in Hungary. As shown in Graph 1, labour-market programmes co-fi nanced by Structural Funds gradually crowded out interventions fi nanced from national sources. In some years, they accounted for over 50 % of programme expenditure by the National Employment Fund, the main fi nancing channel of such measures. An important goal of the "Social Renewal Operational Programme" (SROP) was to increase the volume and quality of active labour-market policies. Following trends in Europe, both services provided "in-house" by the public employment service (PES) and "outsourced" to non-profi t service providers were to be supported. In the examined period, the National Public Employment Service (PES) was the public organisation that bore primary responsibility for this fi eld of public services. It was a multi-level network, consisting of ministerial oversight, a national offi ce (National Labour Offi ce), regional centres and local branch offi ces.
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Th e Managing Authority of SROP could have contracted with the national offi ce (or the overseeing ministry) for one large strategic project and leave its implementation to the internal governance system of PES. Th is would have been a natural choice for several reason. PES had experience in providing such services; it had its own internal system of management and control; and it was in the process of developing it into an advanced system of management by objectives (fi nanced -ironically, as we shall see -from EU funds; Hétfa and Revita 2013a). Alas, it did not happen. Instead of signing a comprehensive contract with PES and leaving its internal management to the organisation, the Managing Authority opted for a different solution. It signed separate contracts for three broad target groups: people with disabilities, people who have received social assistance, and unemployed peo-ple belonging to socially disadvantaged groups.
18 Th e strategic contracts defi ned subprojects for each region, making each regional PES centre directly responsible for keeping procedural obligations and fulfi lling contracted indicators. Although experts of PES and its ministerial oversight were closely involved in the planning and professional control of regional projects as well as their coordination with non-EU-funded activities, the Managing Authority eff ectively circumvented the existing internal governance structure of PES. It did not have suffi cient trust in the capability of the existing internal systems, which were themselves under development. It chose not to rely on its internal system of management and control. Nor did it accept its existing monitoring system for providing indicators but requested regional centres to set up a parallel system for EU-funded projects.
For the projects fi nancing non-profi t service providers, the contractual design was even more radical. Th e ministry proposed that these external providers should be fi nanced through PES. Regional centres would decide about the mix of services and outsource to external providers what they could not effi ciently produce in house. Th is corresponds to the usual international practice and the recommendations of the relevant literature (Bruttel 2005; van Berkel et al. 2012 ): coordination and professional control requires that external non-profi t providers are contracted by the public organisation that is responsible for labour-market services.
19 Aft er long discussions, the Managing Authority vetoed this solution. Instead, it announced open tendering calls for nonprofi ts directly through its Intermediate Body. Th e main reason for the MA's reluctance to rely on PES was the perceived lack of that organisation's capacities to contract for and manage external service provision. Th e MA had no trust in the ability of PES to handle complex and risky contracts with third parties in compliance with all relevant regulations. In eff ect, a new tendering system was created for non-profi t service providers within the fi eld of "development policy", which began to function parallel to and largely uncoordinated with the PES system. Performance indicators appeared as part of this parallel project system.
Higher-education policy. EU funds also greatly contributed to Hungary's higher education budget. As in employment policy, national budgetary appropriations for higher-education institutions decreased steadily in the period, while EU funds virtually poured into the sector, adding as much as 35 per cent in 2012 to yearly national budgetary support (Graph 2). Most of the Fund sources were contracted in project form through a competitive call process, similar to the case of non-profi t providers of active labour-market services. As in labour policy, a self-standing project system arose. Although the ministry responsible for higher education took an active part in designing the calls, they were not integrated into the national system of fi nancing higher-education institutions but were managed separately in the diff erentiated sphere of "development policy". Th e eff orts and failure of integration are best illuminated by the example of the so-called "research university projects".
20
In 2010, the ministry responsible for higher education announced a certifi cation procedure for "research universities".
21 Th e idea was taken from the German Excellence Initiative (launched in 2006), which awards extra funds in a competitive selection process to higher-education institutions which excel in high-quality research. Unlike the German system, the Hungarian ministry did not attach funding directly to the title but declared that certifi ed research universities "may receive additional fi nancial support in a separate procedure. " 22 However, this was not to be. Instead a call for tenders was issued by the responsible Managing Authority (through its Intermediate Body). Th e call was issued before the certifi cation process ended, used diff erent criteria and was eventually won by almost all Hungarian uni-versities, several of which were not to receive certifi cation as "research universities" (Hétfa and Revita 2013b) . Th e project system created by this call was considered by all institutions to be a one-time and short-term aff air from the beginning. It fi nanced projects for two years with no promise of continuation (since even the future of cohesion policy in the EU aft er 2013 was uncertain at the time). It was not integrated into the national governance system of higher education, which could have given it permanence. Th e comparison with the German system is striking. Th ere, the two most important and stable national organisations in research policy 23 were given joint responsibility for running the Excellence Initiative. Th ree rounds were fi nanced between 2006 and 2012, off ering fi ve-year contracts for the selected organisations. Ironically, the German federal government now believes that the main weakness of the Initiative is that it provides support in the form of "projects limited in time and topics" and is now planning to shift to more "permanent arrangements" to fi nance research excellence in higher education.
24 How would they judge the Hungarian case ? It would, of course, be wrong to put down the choice of a less-than-suitable contracting form simply to the myopia or incompetence of the Hungarian government. It was rather the direct result of the political emphasis on absorption and the institutionalisation of cohesion policy refl ecting this emphasis (Hétfa and Revita 2013b).
Th e separated system of projects implied that a transient system of performance monitoring was set up only for these projects. It was managed outside the national governance of higher education by the Intermediate Body and the Managing Authority of the Operational Programme. As in the case of PES, universities had to provide data for this system, while existing systems of data collection were ignored. Although the Ministry of Education collected data on some aspects of performance and a Higher Education Information System was being developed at the time (Hajnal and Ugrósdy 2015) , these systems were considered incapable of providing performance data in a reliable way.
In both labour-market and higher-education policy, performance measurement was institutionalised as part of a newly created and temporary project system, outside the existing national governance structure of the respective policy fi eld. Th e sole reason for this institutional choice was the Managing Authority's endeavour to ensure compliance with the formal requirements of EU regulations and Hungary's contract with the European Commission. Th e potential to incorporate and utilise the performance indicators in the policy process (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008) was therefore heavily constrained by the absorption motive. Indicators were linked to short-term projects, and their "life" ended with the end of projects. Medium and long-term eff ects were by necessity ignored. Nor was there room for learning from the repeated (and possibly refi ned) use of indicators.
25 Projects and indicators were handled by agencies dedicated to absorption rather than sectoral public organisations, pursuing, if imperfectly, substantive policy goals in their areas. Instead of building on and improving the performance-management systems of national public organisations, EU-funded programmes probably delayed their development. As we showed above (Graphs 1 and 2), the fi nancing of both sectors shift ed heavily towards EU sources. Inevitably, administrative eff orts focused on the ad-hoc and transient systems of project instead of developing more permanent structures.
Design of project contracts
Within the constraints of project systems, performance indicators for individual projects could be used in a more or less sophisticated way. Th e available programme evaluations provide information on two important aspects of performance measurement: the handling of performance risks and non-measurable dimensions of performance (cf. Smith 1995; Th iel and Leeuw 2002) .
Evaluations (Hétfa and Revita 2013a, 2013b) revealed that the usual practice was to take key indicators from the Operating Programmes and transpose them as obligatory performance targets into project contracts. (A few other indicators were added when the OP-level indicators seemed irrelevant or incomplete for the project.) Initially, fi nancing was tied in a rather crude form to indicators: if a benefi ciary did not produce a certain threshold value of the indicators on average, it had to pay the money back. Th is placed the entire risk of project performance captured by indicators on the benefi ciary. Th e government played a "hot potato" game of riskshift ing: the national government shift ed the risks associated with the production of indicators to Managing Authorities, the latter to Intermediate Bodies, which shift ed them further to the benefi ciaries. As the programming period wore on, indicator risks materialised and threatened absorption. Th e government agencies responded by taking over part of the risk from project benefi ciaries: indicator values could now fall below threshold levels to a certain extent, and funds would be lost only in proportion to the gap between actual and threshold values. However, interviews revealed that the change was not motivated by more effi cient risk-sharing. Th e risks of benefi ciaries were considered only so far as they threatened timely absorption because benefi ciaries would throw back the hot potatoes of risky indicators by renouncing their contractual obligations and funds. In fact, Managing Authorities emphatically did not look upon indicators as either performance incentives or risksharing tools. Th ey viewed them simply as obligations, imposed by the contract between Commission and Member State, to which all benefi tting actors should contribute roughly in proportion to the funds received (Hétfa and Revita 2013b).
Potential benefi ciaries responded by promising indicator values that were as low as possible ex ante without endangering access to funds and structuring their activities ex post to minimise the risk of not fulfi lling contracted indicator values. When their ex-ante strategy worked out well, indicators became mere administrative burdens (that could be very high, actually), without a distorting eff ect on the organisation's activities. Th is was the case for most indicators in several projects in higher education. Universities promised numbers of refereed publications or numbers of PhD students involved in research projects which could be easily fulfi lled. When indicators were high enough to infl uence the behaviour of benefi ciaries, highly risk-averse behaviour prevailed. Most non-profi t benefi ciaries in the fi eld of active labour-market policy had to tailor their activities to fulfi l indicator requirements (Hétfa and Revita 2013a). Th ey refrained from truly innovative activities and "cherry-picked" their project locations, target groups and individual participants very cautiously. Although they were assumed to reach the most vulnerable social groups, they faced strong perverse incentives not do so.
Offi cials at Managing Authorities and Ministries providing professional advice usually paid careful attention to choosing appropriate project indicators. Nonetheless, the one-time nature of projects made it unreasonable to invest in designing sophisticated measures, monitoring them and demanding benefi ciaries to supply them. Although the problem of non-measured aspects was oft en realised, the project system allowed little room to handle it. One exception was the appropriate design of selection procedures. By examining the previous performance of an applicant and its professional reputation, the probability for it to be capable and willing to perform well regardless of concrete indicators can be increased. Programme evaluations found some weak evidence that selection procedures preferred beneficiaries with better capabilities than their peers according to common professional standards in their fi eld. Universities with improving publication records were more likely to attract bigger funds (Hétfa and Revita 2013b). Nonprofi ts with higher levels of rationalised organisation and professional competence were more likely to receive funds for active labour-market service provision (Hétfa and Revita 2013a).
Overall, the picture emerges that the overriding goal of project indicators was to ensure that the formal indicator targets of operational programmes would be reached. Although Managing Authorities were aware of performance risks and non-measured aspects of performance, they had neither room for, nor interest in handling these problems in but the most rudimentary ways. Th e organisations' external incentives that favoured absorption and formal compliance vis-à-vis the European Commission were clearly refl ected in their decisions about the design and use of performance indicators at the project level.
Discussion
Our fi rst research question concerned the incentives created by the double PA relationship between the European Commission, the national government and the Managing Authority that infl uenced the last organisation's decisions about the design and use of performance measurement. An institutional analysis identifi ed three major incentives for the national government due to its PA contract with the European Commission. Th e Commission as a principal had an interest in expecting formal compliance with procedural regulations, including the supply of verifi able performance indicators, as well as timely absorption of Funds. Th e importance of absorption was underlined by its political salience due to the relatively large size of Funds allocated to Hungary. In addition, domestic politics provided a third incentive: to use funds eff ectively to further substantive policy goals rather than mere absorption or formal compliance. Empirical evidence showed that in the period observed, absorption was the overriding goal for the Hungarian government. Th is was mainly a consequence of the political salience of absorption due to the very large volume of Funds and the administrative challenge of complying with elaborate EU procedures. Policy eff ectiveness remained a secondary goal, although it became somewhat more important, as the share of EU sources in the fi nanced policy fi elds grew in a time of austerity.
Th e identifi ed incentives infl uenced the government's behaviour in the lower-level PA relationships with Managing Authorities. Ensuring absorption was the single most important political expectation vis-à-vis the implementing agents. Even more important, this goal was refl ected in the way agencies were institutionalised. Th ey were organised as a newly created system diff erentiated and separated from existing public organisations that were responsible for the policy fi elds in which Funds were used. Ensuring formal compliance and absorption were set as the main organisational goals for them. Contribution to substantive policy goals remained a secondary and weak expectation throughout the period, despite growing awareness that coordination with sectoral ministries and national agencies would be desirable.
How were the external incentives actually refl ected in the practice of performance measurement within Managing Authorities ? Th e absorption and formal compliance incentives implied that performance measurement be employed chiefl y to ensure the fulfi lling of verifi able performance indicators for the European Commission. Th e programme evaluations provided detailed evidence that this was indeed the case in the two policy fi elds reviewed (active labour-market policy and higher education). First, ad-hoc systems of performance measurement were built outside the existing governance structures of the policy fi elds. Managing Authorities set them up parallel to existing systems that were centred on sectoral ministries and employed national budgetary sources. In principle, implementing agencies could have relied on the internal governance systems of existing national organisations (such as the national ministry or agency) for implementation and monitoring performance. However, they had no trust in these national organisations' capability to monitor and fulfi l indicator requirements. As a negative consequence, the institutional setting precluded the emergence of non-transient systems of performance management that could have enabled the integration of formal measurement into policy cycles (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008 ).
Second, project-level indicators within the above-mentioned systems served the purpose of ensuring that programme-level indicators would be fulfi lled in a verifi able way. Financing was linked to project indicators simply and directly. Distortions due to the riskiness of performance and its non-measurable dimensions were realised by offi cials but they were largely ignored, due to a lack of incentives and resources. Although sectoral administrations became involved in designing the professional content of projects, the indicator system remained unaff ected, fi rmly in the hands of the Managing Authorities grouped in the National Development Agency.
Overall, our fi ndings suggest that the institutions of cohesion policy exerted a rather unfavourable infl uence on performance measurement for EU Funds in Hungary. Th e strong incentives of absorption and formal compliance with EU regulations hindered the creation of a system of performance measurement that would handle measurement problems in a sophisticated way and be eff ectively integrated in the policy process. At the same time, our analysis also suggests under what conditions these negative eff ects might be mitigated. If funds are large enough to be truly vital for the relevant policy fi elds and implementing agencies are integrated into, rather than diff erentiated from, sectoral administrations, their politically imposed organisational goals are likely to shift from absorption towards policy eff ectiveness. Nonetheless, it seems safe to predict that, short of radical change in the underlying institutional rules of EU cohesion, absorption will remain a prominent goal, compromising the design and use of performance measurement for Structural Funds.
